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Reflective Reasoning & Philosophy 
Nick Byrd 
Stevens Institute of Technology 
 
Abstract. Philosophy is a reflective activity. So perhaps it is unsurprising that many 
philosophers have claimed that reflection plays an important role in shaping and even 
improving our philosophical thinking. This hypothesis seems plausible given that training in 
philosophy has correlated with better performance on tests of reflection and reflective 
reasoning has correlated with demonstrably better judgments in a variety of domains. This 
article reviews the hypothesized roles of reflection in philosophical thinking as well as the 
empirical evidence for these roles. This reveals that although there are reliable links between 
reflection and philosophical judgment among both laypeople and philosophers, the role of 
reflection in philosophical thinking may nonetheless depend in part on other factors, some 
of which have yet to be determined. So progress in research on reflection in philosophy may 
require further innovation in experimental methods and psychometric validation of 
philosophical measures. 
Keywords: reflection, reflection test, reflective equilibrium, reflective endorsement, 
experimental philosophy, metaphilosophy, epistemology 
 
“A preoccupation with reflection is, arguably, the Western philosophical tradition’s most 
distinctive feature, in both historical and contemporary contexts.” –John Doris (2015) 
 
Some questions prompt an intuitive response. When we ask, “How much should I donate?”, 
our first response might be to opt for the first amount that feels right. Of course, we can step 
back and reflect on this feeling. “Is that enough?” “Can I afford to give that much?” This 
reflection may either reinforce our initial impulse—“That much is fine”—or revise it—“Upon 
reflection, I can afford to give much more”.  
Many philosophers accept that such intuition and reflection are standard fare in philosophical 
thinking. Philosophers appeal to intuition in arguments for or against certain claims or views 
(e.g., Chalmers, 2014; Climenhaga, 2018; De Cruz, 2014b; Mallon, 2016). As Hilary Kornblith 
puts it, “George Bealer does it. Roderick Chisholm does it a lot. Most philosophers do it openly 
and unapologetically, and the rest arguably do it too, although some of them would deny it” 
(Kornblith, 1998; cf. Cappelen, 2012; Machery, 2017; Williamson, 2008). Philosophers also 
consider reflection essential for double-checking our philosophical intuitions—e.g., “render[ing] 
coherent and …justify[ing] our convictions of social justice” (Rawls, 1971, p. 18). 
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Intuition and reflection are also hot topics in cognitive science. Daniel Kahneman’s popular 
book Thinking Fast & Slow (2011) may be the most well-known compendium of this literature. 
Of course, some of the findings in that book have been disputed (Kahneman, 2017; Schimmack, 
2020). Indeed, research on intuitive impulses and more deliberative responses is an ongoing 
topic of investigation in cognitive science with unresolved and still-unfolding discoveries (e.g., 
De Neys, 2018; Pennycook, 2018). 
At some point the philosophy and cognitive science of intuition and reflection collided: 
scholars started running studies and experiments to test claims about how intuition and 
reflection actually impact philosophical thinking. They found some evidence that moral, 
political, and other philosophical beliefs seemed to vary depending on the degree to which 
people employed intuitive or reflective reasoning. However, not all these results have replicated 
and some methods produce different results than others. So many questions about how intuition 
and reflection feature in philosophical thinking remain unanswered.  
In what follows, I will review some of this literature. First, I will elaborate on reflection’s 
theoretical role in philosophy. Then I will explicate the notion of ‘reflection’ that we will focus 
on in this article. That will pave the way to consider how reflection is measured as well as how 
its psychological construct features in empirical investigations of philosophical reasoning. I also 
consider whether the philosophical judgments that correlate with or result from reflection are 
normatively superior to their alternatives. This leads me to the conclusion that progress in 
research about reflection in philosophy may require advancements in experimental 
manipulations of reflection as well as measurement of philosophical tendencies.  
Reflection In Philosophy 
Recent philosophy is rife with concepts that involve reflection. Consider some examples.  
• “Reflective knowledge”, unlike animal knowledge, was said to involve understanding of 
not just a perceived, remembered, or inferred fact but its relationship to the broader 
network of beliefs and knowledge (Sosa, 1991, p. 240). 
• “Reflective equilibrium” has been invoked explicitly in discussions of how to determine 
what is just (Rawls, 1971) and invoked implicitly in discussions of how to justify the rules 
of logic (Daniels, 2013; Goodman, 1983). 
• “Reflective agency” was considered important to understanding human action (Kennett & 
Fine, 2009; Velleman, 1989, 2000; Wallace, 2006). 
• “Reflective scrutiny” has been said to allow us to evaluate our ethical view from within the 
confines of that view (Hursthouse, 1999, Chapter 8). 
• “Reflective persons” have been described as unlikely to accept certain claims (e.g., 
Sidgwick, 1874).  
• “Reflective self-knowledge” has referred to the unique awareness we enjoy over our own—
as opposed to others’—beliefs, desires, intentions, and other mental states (Peacocke, 2014).  
There are no doubt more examples of how the concept of reflection appears in English-
speaking philosophy (Byrd, 2021a). Analyzing all of them is a valuable project that goes beyond 
the limits of this article. The point is just that ‘reflection’ often appears in some of philosophy’s 
most influential concepts, arguments, and views.  
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Of course, not all philosophers mean the same thing when they use ‘reflect’ and its cognates. 
So it is worth explaining the notion of ‘reflection’ on which I focus in this article. 
Explicating ‘Reflection’ 
If you spend enough time reading English philosophy, you may find that ‘reflection’ is often 
used as a term of art that means something specific and technical. Consider a classic description 
of reflection. 
 
I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse into 
view […]. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I 
believe? (Korsgaard, 1996, Lecture 3) 
 
Those who are familiar with the rest of that text will know that Christine Korsgaard is 
explaining how the human mind “cannot settle for [mere] perception and desire” because “it 
needs a reason” (1996, Lecture 3). The idea is that reflection is supposed to help us find a reason 
to accept or modify our initial perceptions, desires, impulses, intuitions, etc.  
 
The role of reflection is […] to step back from the immediate situation, to calculate 
consequences, to compensate for the immediate force of one desire which might not be the 
most advantageous to follow […]. (Taylor, 1976, p. 287) 
 
Thus, the notion of reflection that these philosophers are interested has a purpose: double-
checking our initial responses. Further, this notion of reflection involves at least two 
components: stepping back and consciously reconsidering. So, roughly, reflective equilibrium 
involves pausing to reconsider whether our first response coheres with the rest of our 
considered beliefs. Likewise, reflective endorsement would involve some sort of assent after 
deliberately inhibiting and evaluating our initial response. This two-factor account of reflection 
is not isolated to philosophy. It is also found in cognitive science. 
Reflection in Cognitive Science 
Dual process theories in cognitive science distinguish between at least two reasoning types 
or processes (Frankish, 2010). For example, dual process theories might distinguish between fast 
and slow, associative and non-associative, or reflective and unreflective reasoning (Byrd, 2019). 
Importantly, some of these distinctions are orthogonal to one another preventing us from, say, 
inferring that reasoning is reflective just because it is slow or non-associative (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, experimental psychologists, behavioral economists, and other social scientists 
have been developing tests of people’s disposition to reason reflectively for decades. Consider 
one of the most famous reflection test questions: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The ball 
costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). 
Cognitive scientists have found that the first answer that jumps to many people’s minds is “10 
cents” (Frederick, 2005). Of course, a moment’s reflection can reveal that the correct answer is 
actually “5 cents”.  
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Because reflection tests are designed to lure us toward a particular response that, upon 
reflection, can be determined to be incorrect, they seem to track the two behavioral components 
of reflection stepping back and reconsidering an initial impulse (Byrd, 2021b). Moreover, some 
evidence suggests that cognitive reflection tests like the bat-and-ball problem measure a 
domain-general disposition. For instance, people who performed better on reflection tests have 
also reasoned more reflectively about probability (Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012), 
logic (e.g., Byrd & Conway, 2019, Tables 1 and 2), and Newtonian physics (Gette & Kryjevskaia, 
2019). 
It is worth noting that authors of some reflection tests realize that these tests track not only 
the disposition to reflect, but related phenomena such as reading comprehension and—for 
mathematical reflection tests like the bat-and-ball problem—mathematical ability (Frederick, 
2005). Indeed some have found that mathematical reflection test performance can be 
indistinguishable from general math test performance (e.g., Attali & Bar-Hillel, 2020; Erceg, 
Galic, & Ružojčić, 2020). So non-mathematical reflection tests have been developed in order to 
overcome these limitations (e.g., Sirota, Kostovičová, Juanchich, Dewberry, & Marshall, 2020).  
Of course, with the advent of web-based research, many reflection tests are completed online, 
limiting researchers’ ability to understand what people are actually thinking when they 
complete reflection tests. So cognitive scientists may wonder whether two common assumptions 
about the test are valid: that lured responses indicate a lack of reflection and correct responses 
indicate that reflection occurred. To test these assumptions, scientists have started recording 
people thinking aloud as they solve reflection tests (e.g., Szaszi, Szollosi, Palfi, & Aczel, 2017). 
Importantly, thinking aloud did not seem to impact performance on non-mathematical 
reflection tests and—even more importantly—the best predictor of performance on such 
reflection tests was the probability that participants stopped to reconsider their initial response 
(Byrd, Gongora, Joseph, & Sirota, 2021). Only a minority of responses violated the assumptions 
of reflection tests (ibid.). This suggests that reflection tests performance is usually a good 
measure of philosophers’ and cognitive scientists two-factor notion of reflection. Even so, 
cognitive scientists may discover more and better ways to measure reflection in the future. 
Reflection in Cognitive Science of Philosophy 
At this point, one may wonder if cognitive scientists have collaborated with philosophers to 
study philosophical thinking. After all, cognitive scientists may be able to help philosophers test 
their claims about how reflection features in philosophical reasoning (Knobe, 2007). For instance, 
what patterns would find if cognitive scientists measured and manipulated reflection and then 
tracked corresponding changes in philosophical thinking? Cognitive scientists of philosophy 
have been doing this kind of research for over a decade. This section will review some of their 
prominent findings as well as some unanswered questions. 
Reflection & Philosophy Among Laypeople 
Some of the most well-known investigations of how reflection features in philosophical 
reasoning are in the domain of moral psychology. After neuroscientific research revealed that 
brain activity in areas associated with reflective reasoning predicted more consequentialist 
responses to moral dilemmas that propose mitigating a great harm by causing a smaller harm 
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(Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004), psychological research found some evidence 
that reflection caused and correlated with more consequentialist judgments about other moral 
thought experiments (Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2011). 
Since this time, better reflection test performance has predicted moral judgments about 
unintended side effects (Pinillos, Smith, Nair, Marchetto, & Mun, 2011), a tendency toward 
atheism or agnosticism (Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016), liberal political 
preferences (Byrd & Białek, 2021; Deppe et al., 2015; Saribay & Yilmaz, 2017; Yilmaz & Alper, 
2019), and the orthodox “Gettier intuition” about knowledge (Byrd & Cullen, 2021; Machery et 
al., 2017).  
However, not all these links between reflection and philosophical preferences are well 
understood. For example, the links between reflection and consequentialist moral judgments have 
also been found between reflection and deontological moral judgments (Byrd & Conway, 2019; 
Byrd & Cullen, 2021; Reynolds, Byrd, & Conway, 2021). Also, some links between reflection and 
political preferences have been stronger in western, educated, industrialized, rich, democratic—
a.k.a., WEIRD—countries (Yilmaz & Alper, 2019). 
Further, some research has not replicated links between reflection and moral judgments (e.g., 
Attie & Knobe, 2017; Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, & Hütter, 2017), politically 
liberal preferences (e.g. Price-Blackshear, Sheldon, Corcoran, & Bettencourt, 2019), and belief in 
god (e.g., Sanchez, Sundermeier, Gray, & Calin-Jageman, 2017). More research has found that 
the links between reflection and religiosity replicate in only some countries (Gervais et al., 2018) 
and religions (Byrd & Sytsma, In preparation). These results suggest that some reported 
reflection-philosophy relationships either depend on other factors—such as how one measures 
philosophical beliefs (e.g., Bahçekapili & Yilmaz, 2017)—or are false positives. 
Finally, some have found that attempting to increase reflection experimentally has had 
underwhelming effects on philosophical judgments (e.g., Byrd & Cullen, 2021; de Bruin, 2020; 
Deppe et al., 2015; Kneer, Colaço, Alexander, & Machery, 2021; Paxton, Bruni, & Greene, 2014; 
Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). To boot, sometimes reflection’s effect is the opposite of what 
we would expect based on the prior correlational findings (McPhetres, Conway, Hughes, & 
Zuckerman, 2018; Yilmaz & Isler, 2019). 
Some philosophers and cognitive scientists are responding to these mixed results by 
conducting massive replication projects (Cova et al., 2018), developing better methods (Byrd et 
al., 2021; Cullen, Chapkovski, & Byrd, In preparation) and considering new interpretations of 
prior results (Knobe, 2021; cf. Machery & Stich, 2021). Some scholars are also pushing to include 
more underrepresented participants in research on philosophical thinking (Persson, Heilig, 
Tinghög, & Capusan, 2020), including actual philosophers (e.g., Bourget & Chalmers, 2014).  
Reflection & Philosophy Among Philosophers 
Around the time that some cognitive scientists were finding that philosophical judgments 
often correlated with reflection test performance, other cognitive scientists were finding that 
philosophical education also correlated with reflection test performance: those with more 
training in philosophy tended to be more reflective (Livengood, Sytsma, Feltz, Scheines, & 
Machery, 2010). This has recently been confirmed in a larger, cross-cultural dataset (Byrd & 
Sytsma, In preparation).  
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This led some researchers to look for links between reflection and philosophical judgments 
among those with advanced training in philosophy. Findings from smaller samples were unable 
to detect small correlations between philosophers beliefs and reflection test performance (Yaden 
& Anderson, 2021). However, multiple studies of larger samples that included people with a 
Ph.D. in philosophy, found that reflection test performance correlated with philosophical beliefs 
(such as theism) even when controlling for education, gender, personality, and other reasoning 
tests (Byrd, 2021d). This provides preliminary evidence that links between reflection and 
philosophy that have been detected among laypeople may be detectable among philosophers as 
well.  
Reflection & Normativity 
Some cognitive scientists have argued for the normative superiority of certain philosophical 
beliefs by appeal to their correlations with reflective reasoning (e.g., Baron, 1994; Greene, 2013). 
The idea is that reflection leads to better judgments. For instance, reflection test performance has 
been linked to correctly identifying fake news (Pennycook, McPhetres, Zhang, Lu, & Rand, 2020; 
Pennycook & Rand, 2019), recognizing pseudo-profound bullshit (Čavojová, Secară, Jurkovič, & 
Šrol, 2019; Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015), rejecting conspiracy theories 
(Stecula & Pickup, 2021), overcoming the sunk cost fallacy (Ronayne, Sgroi, & Tuckwell, 2020), 
and less susceptibility to misinformation about their own eyewitness memory (C. M. Greene, 
Maloney-Derham, & Mulligan, 2020). So if more reflective people tend toward some 
philosophical beliefs over alternatives, then—according to the appeal to reflection—those 
philosophical beliefs are probably superior. While recent evidence undermines some appeals to 
reflection (Byrd & Conway, 2019), one might wonder if the appeal to reflection could be 
marshalled for or against other philosophical beliefs (Byrd, 2021c; cf. Easton, 2018). 
Empirical Problems With Normative Appeals  
There is at least one empirical obstacle for such a broad normative appeal to reflection: it is 
not obvious how dispositions to overcome faulty impulses about basic mathematical and logical 
questions entail or even imply normatively superior reasoning in higher-order domains such as 
academic philosophy. This challenge to the appeal to reflection resembles a challenge to the 
appeal to expert intuition (Clarke, 2013; Horvath & Koch, 2021; Machery, 2017, Chapter 5; Nado, 
2014; Weinberg, Gonnerman, Buckner, & Alexander, 2010). Specifically, appeals to reflection 
tests still lack an empirically adequate account of how someone's reflection about contrived 
questions about bats and balls shows that their philosophical beliefs have also benefitted from 
reflection (De Neys, 2020). This has motivated some researchers to develop tools for stimulating 
reflection during the philosophical thinking and discourse that they observe (Cullen et al., In 
preparation). 
Philosophical Problems With Normative Appeals 
There are also philosophical obstacles to the appeal to reflection. For instance, some 
philosophers consider  certain philosophical beliefs justified independently of reflective 
reasoning (cf. De Cruz, 2014a; Plantinga, 1967). Indeed, some of the beliefs that anti-correlate 
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with reflection test performance—e.g., theism (Byrd, 2021d; Byrd & Sytsma, In preparation; 
Freidin & Martini, 2021; Gervais et al., 2018; Pennycook et al., 2016)—are precisely the beliefs 
that some philosophers take to be justified independently of reflection. These philosophers are 
not alone in treating certain beliefs as less subject to certain epistemic norms than other beliefs: 
both Children and adults in the US seem to employ different epistemic criteria for scientific 
explanations or facts than they do for religious, ideological, or ethical beliefs (Cusimano & 
Lombrozo, 2021; e.g., Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, & Banaji, 2013; Liquin & Lombrozo, 2018; Metz, 
Weisberg, & Weisberg, 2018). Thus, some people may find epistemically normative appeals to 
reflection more compelling for some domains than others. 
Overcoming Obstacles To Normative Appeals 
One way to surmount the obstacles to normative appeals to reflection is further 
experimentation. After all, we already established that, in principle, one could randomly assign 
participants to reflection-inducing, reflection-inhibiting, as well as control conditions and then 
test whether and how much philosophical tendencies vary between the conditions.  
Alas, there are a variety of reasons to think that momentary manipulations of individuals’ 
reflection may not reliably advance our understanding the causal role of reflection in 
philosophical thinking. 
 
1. As previously mentioned, researchers frequently find that inducing reflective and 
unreflective reasoning is more difficult than earlier work suggested (e.g., Brañas-Garza, 
Kujal, & Lenkei, 2019; Enke et al., 2021; Markovits et al., 2020; Meyer et al., 2015; Thompson 
et al., 2013) 
2. Even if we learn how to successfully and reliably produce immediate changes in reflection 
during experiments, these changes may only impact novel and, therefore, unfamiliar 
philosophical questions. Such momentary changes in individuals’ reflection may not, 
however, produce changes in more considered, trained, and identity-based philosophical 
beliefs—e.g., the beliefs that some people (including philosophers) spend their lives 
publicly defending.  
 
So how can we overcome these two methodological challenges to experimentally testing the 
effect of reflection on certain philosophical beliefs and judgments? Perhaps we cannot.  
However, those who wish to appeal to reflection may want a more thorough test of 
reflection’s impact on philosophical thinking. To do this, we may have to develop more potent 
interventions on reflection. Rather than momentary tasks that individuals complete during a 
short survey, we may need  
• weeks-long interventions that teach people how to reason more reflectively (Cullen, Fan, 
Brugge, & Elga, 2018) 
• consultations with peers that have experiences, values, and beliefs that are difficult for us 
to conceive on our own (Cullen et al., 2021; Elga, 2007). 
In other words, manipulating reflection may require more than what most cognitive 
interventions require. It may require the kind of interventions that students of philosophy tend 
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to experience: some training in how to use reflection, sustained periods of reflection, and 
discussion amongst peers. That way, when people are encouraged to step back and re-consider 
reasons for their philosophical judgment, they can competently do so. 
Such longitudinal and social interventions are difficult, requiring more time, more funding, 
and additional analytic techniques. So philosophers and cognitive scientists may need to 
develop new tools that eliminate some of these impediments to more severe tests of reflection’s 
causal and normative roles in philosophy thinking.  
Conclusion 
Reflective reasoning is central to both philosophy and the cognitive science thereof. The 
theoretical and empirical research about reflection and its relation to philosophical thinking is 
voluminous. The existing findings provide preliminary evidence that reflective reasoning may 
be related to tendencies for certain philosophical judgments and beliefs over others. However, 
there are some signs that there is more to the story about reflection’s role in philosophical 
thinking than our current evidence can reveal. Scholars will need to continue developing new 
hypotheses, methods, and interpretations to reveal these hitherto latent details. 
The recommendations in this article are by no means exhaustive. For instance, in addition to 
better experimental manipulations and measures of reflection (Byrd, 2021b), philosophers and 
cognitive scientists will also need to validate their measures of philosophical thinking to ensure 
that subtle differences in wording of thought experiments do not influence people’s judgments 
in unexpected ways (Cullen, 2010). After all, philosophical judgments can vary significantly 
depending on slight differences in wording even when reflection is not manipulated (e.g., 
Nahmias, Coates, & Kvaran, 2007). Scholars may also need to develop ways to empirically 
dissociate previously conflated philosophical judgments (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) in order 
to prevent and clarify misleading results (Byrd & Conway, 2019; Conway, Goldstein-
Greenwood, Polacek, & Greene, 2018). 
All of this is to say that philosophers and cognitive scientists’ preoccupation with reflection 
is here to stay. A few decades of investigation about reflection in philosophy has established not 
only a promising research program, but also a growing list of remaining questions that will 
require at least a few more decades to answer. I look forward to revisiting this article in a few 
years to see how far we have come. 
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